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The theory of the competitivefirm under price uncertainty is used to
develop a money metric of a producer’swillingness to pay for additional
information. For a restricted class of utility functions, empirical esti-
mates of the money metric using secondary data can be derived from the firm’s
risk averse supply or factor demand function. The procedure is illustrated
by an application to an agriculturalmarket.
o1. INTRODUCTION
The central focus of this paper is the developmentof an easily com-
putable money metric of an agent’s willingness to pay for informationunder
risk. Empirical estimates of the value of informationare important for
obtaining insights into issues such as the informationalefficiency of
alternativemarket structures, the effects of the quality of agent’s con-
ditional forecasts of market prices on the efficiency of resource use and
the social profitabilityof informationsupplied by private enterprise and
public agencies.
The paper draws on previous contributionsto the theory of competitive
firm under price uncertainty,namely Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), Sandmo
(1971), and more recently Pope (1978, 1980) and Pope, Chavas and Just (1983).
The latter contributionprovides insight into the econometric application of
the theory and into the validity of producer surplus measures of firm welfare
under risk. In these models, the production decision is made given the .
producer’s subjective distributionof output price.
The value of informationin this context can be formulatedusing the
Bayesian approach which amounts to a comparison of expected utility levels
from choices based on prior informationwith choices based on additional
information. Contributionsin this area are numerous and include those of
Lindley (1971),Winkler (1972) and more recently Gould (1974) and Hess (1982)
who focused on the effects of risk preferences and the nature of the distribu-
tion of random events on the value of information.
However, the literature has given little attention to the question of
deriving a money metric of an agent’s willingness to pay for informationunder
risk that can be applied to an econometricanalysis of observed behavior.
In part, the problem lies with the empirical application of Bayes’ theorem to-2-
explain the observed behavior of risk averse agents. While estimates of the
agent’s prior distributionof uncertain events may be obtained from observed
choices, or in some cases elicited directly, the content of additional
information, the process by which additional information becomes available
and whether the agent behaves as though the prior is updated according to
Bayes~ theorem raises major difficulties in applying the theorem to estimating
the value of information from observed behavior.
The approach presented in this paper is easier to use in empirical appli-
cation even though it bears a strong resemblance to the Bayesian procedure.
For a restricted class of utility functions, it’s shown that the money metric
of an agent’s willingness to pay for additional information can be computed
from the firm’s risk averse supply or factor demand function.
The problem is specified in section II of the paper and the measures of
willingness to pay for additional information are presented in section IIIe
To illustrate the appnoach, an analytical model is specified in section IV
and the results from fitting it to time series data from the U.S. fed cattle
industry are reported in section V. The empirical results suggest that pro-
ducers are risk averse and that the bimonthly mean value of information to
a typical producer varies from a deflated 12 cents per cwt to 46 cents per
cwt over the 1970-80 period depending on the amount of additional information.
II. THE PROBLEM
The competitivefirm under price uncertainty is described in a
Bernoullian frameworkwhere the agent’s expected utility function is a
strictly concave, continuous and differentiablefunction of profits. In
this case the primal-dual function can be expressed as
L* = EU[Pq* - C(q*)] - Eu[pq - c(q)] (1)-3-
where the first and second bracketed terms are the indirect and direct
expected utility function respectively,P is stochastic output price, C(q)
is the cost function and E is the expectation operator. The first order
equation for a minimum is the familiar condition
aL* — = -E[U’(T)(P - C’(q))] = O
aq (2)
where U’(T) = dU/d~ and C’(q) is positive and continuous.
To describe the different output choices that occur when the agent’s
distribution of output price is based on different sets of informationand
to facilitate the derivation of various measures of the value of information,
two states of informationare defined: the subjective and the more informed
state.
In the case of the subjective state, let f“(p) denote the agent’s prior.
distributionof output price based on the information available at the time
the output decision is made. The optimal quantity of output can be deter-
mined by using equation (2) where the expectation,denoted E‘, is taken with
respect to f“(p). The agent’s optimal output choice is representedby q“.
However, prior to the realization of output price, profit remains a stochastic
variable:
o ‘IT= Pq” - C(q”).
The utility that the agent expects to obtain from producing q“ is E“U(ITo).
The more informed state is a situation where the agent’s beliefs are
based on more information than in the subjective state. Let fro(p) denote this
more informed distributionon the stochastic variable P which, while not
fundamental to our approach, can be viewed as having the properties of a
Bayesian posterior distributionobtained from updating f“(p) with additional-4-
data such as an independentlysupplied price forecast. The optimal output
choice in the more informed state, denoted by qm, can again be determined
by equation (2) with expectations,Em, taken with respect to the more
informed distribution. Prior to realizationof the output price, profit
is a stochasticvariable represented by
The
Ill
‘IT = Pqm- C(qm).
expected utility in the more informed state is E“’U(Tm).
The problem is to derive an easily computablemoney metric of the
agent’s willingness to pay for the additional information embodied in the
more informed distributionfro(p).
111. VALUE OF INFORMATION
Three different measures of the value of informationare presented.
The first two are ex-ante measures. In this case, decisions made based on
information embodied in the prior f“(p) are compared with those made in
the more informed state with informationembodied in fro(p). The third
measure is a special case of the first two measures; it is a measure of
the value of perfect information,determined by comparing realized profits
from the choice q“ with profits obtained when price is known with certainty.
Ex-ante Measures
Since the more informed distribution is defined as more descriptiveof
the stochasticvariable P than the prior distribution,a willingness to
pay measure of the value of information can be derived by determiningwhat
it would be worth to the agent to know the more informed distributionrather
than the subjective distribution.-5-
For the first ex-ante measure, denoted by VIl, the maximizationof EOU(IT)
yields the optimal quantity, q“, produced in the subjective state with cor-
responding expected utility EOU(nO). However, the expected utility of the
choice q“ in the more informed state is’E~(mO) = Em[U(pqO - C(q”)]. Hence,
the value of informationcan be defined to be the difference in the more
informed state between the expected utility of producing qm and the expected
utility of producing q“:
VII = E%(mm) - E%(n”). (3)
It can be shown that VII will always be non-negative. By derivationof
quantity qm, it is clear that qm = q* in equation (1) when expectations
are taken with respect to fro(p). By definition of the primal-dualproblem,
EU(IT*)is the maximum value of expected utility that can be attained over
all possible values of profit. Thus,
L* = EU(n*) - EU(IT)~O.
When expectationsare taken with respect to fro(p), the expression for L* becomes
E%(ITm) - E%(T) ~ O ,
and hence, VII is non-negative.
This measure of the value of information,however, is not very useful
because utility has only ordinal properties. To avoid this problem a money
metric similar to equivalent variation in the certainty case can be derived.
To facilitate the development of this measure, consider the simple case when
fro(p) has only two parameters: a mean and variance. In Figure 1, the mean-
variance (E, V) space has been given for the more informed state where OAB is
the mean-variancefrontier of response possibilities,and the Urncurves





















optimal output level in the more informed state, qm, and the random variable
profits,Tm. Let decisions made in the subjective state lead to production
q“. Then the point correspondingto production level q“ must lie on or
below the mean-variancefrontier OAB because this curve represents the set
of all efficient output levels in the more informed state. Suppose that
output level q“ can be representedby point C which by necessity, lies on
a lower isoutility curve Em. 2 Let V12 be the amount of monetary payment that
must be given to an agent who produces q“ so that his expected utility in
the more informed state would have been the same as if he had produced qm,
V12 is a monetary (as opposed to utility) measure of the value of information.
It is illustratedby the distance on the vertical axis between points C and D.
Stated in general terms, define a nonstochasticvariable V12 such that
E%(mm) = E%(ITO + V12).~’ (4)
To show that VI, is ‘non-negative, recall that U’(IT)> 0 implies U(IT,) >
&
U(IT2),if ITl>m2. Since it has
problem that E%(ITm)~ E%(mO),
L
already been shown from the primal-dual
then by equation (4), E%(w” + V12) > E%(To).
By definitionof expectations,
IU(r” + V12)fm(p)dp > $U(fi”)fm(p)dpo (5)
But by the properties of integrals, expression (5) implies U(m”+ V12) ~U(mO)
for all p. Since u’(m) > 0, no + V12~IT0. And hence, V12 is non-negative.
The empirical advantage of this approach lies in the ease of obtaining
a money metric of the value of having the additional informationembodied
in fro(p). In general, knowledge of the agent’s utility function and fro(p)
are required to compute the value of information. However, knowlege of
the initial beliefs f“(p) are not required. Estimates of fro(p) may come-8-
about through public or private price forecasts or research that yields
insights into factors determining the distributionof P. Given knowledge of
the agent’s utility function, our measure of the value of informationbecomes
a key input into determining the social or private profitabilityof efforts
to supply agents with the knowledge embodied in fro(p).





of this approach becomes more apparent if the expected
restricted to a member of the following class:
+ +
g(q,a); fJ= (u~, ~~, lO., uk) (6)
the kth central moment of price. It has been shown by
Pope and others that the indirect expected utility function corresponding




given by the area
of utility.
To derive an
to the risk averse supply function as follows
= q*. (7)
Just show that if equation (7) holds, producer surplus,
behind the risk averse supply curve, is a money metric
explicit
more informed state can be
expression for
m stated as q =
’12‘ the supply function in the
*
q(p, urn). Then, VIZ is given by
V12=~ r q(p, am)dp-qo. (~m-po)
Pqo q
(8)
where the lower limit of integration is the value of p satisfying the
+ q“
expression q“ = q(p , urn). To show that this condition is the money
q“
‘etric ’12’ it follows from (6) that expanding (8) yields-9-
+
V12 = ~mqm - C(qm) - g(qm, crm)
+
- ~mqo + C(q”) + g(q”, am) (9)
2/ which Is precisely condition (4) when expected utility is of the form (6).-
This result is depicted in Figure 2. If the agent’s prior beliefs are
such that q“ is observed, then (9) is given by the triangular area a. Area
b depicts the value of (9) when the agent’s beliefs are such that q“’ is
observed. Empirical estimates of these values for the fed cattle industry
appear in a later section of this paper.
Measures of the Value of Perfect Information
A special case of the measure developed above is the measure of the value
of perfect information. Note that the choice q“ which maximizes expected
utility based on the prior f“(p), yields, ex-post, the realized profits given
byrr = prqO- C(qO) where pr is the realized price. If the price pr were





maximized when the choice q* maxmizes profits, i.e., IT*=
Correspondingto (5), the value of perfect informationis
* r n -T (lo)
where it follows from the primal-dualproblem, that (10) cannot be negative.
The graphical analysis of this measure is similar to Figure 2 except the
risk averse supply (factor demand) function is replaced by the traditional
supply (factor demand) function.
The usefulness of this approach now becomes apparent. Even though U(IT)














In this case, if the establishmentof a forward market is being contemplated
or if considerationis being given to a policy of announcing the price of
output at the time production decisions are made, our procedure gives insights
into
III.
output response and changes in profits in a rather straightforwardmanner.
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
Equation (6) does not provide much insights into the functionalform of
the indirect utility function because ITdepends on, among other factors) the
underlying production function. For notational convenience,let V denote the
form of the indirect utility function. The procedure employed here is to
approximateV by a second order Taylor series expansion.
+ +
Let the parameters of V be representedas the vector W = (;l,F, a).
+
where PI is a vector of variable input prices. When all the parameters have
+ +
been normalized around their mean values, expanding V around W = O yields:
+ +
. v= v(:) + f =
i=l awi
wi+l/2 f f- WiWj + higher order terms. (11)
i=l j=l i j
Truncate the expression at the second order and substitute the following terms:
+
a2v(;) V(b=ao; -= “—=
i ai’ ah aw ij ‘ij”
Hence,
n-+ !? A
v(i) ~ v(w) =ao+ ~
~=1 aiwi + 1/2 f ~ tlijwiwjo
i=l j=l
(12)
By Young’s theorem, there is symmetry between cross partial derivatives.
Thus, Bij ‘6ji* Let Wi = Pli where i = 1, 2 SO., n; Wn+l ‘~; and Ws+n= IJ
where s = 2, 3, .... k. From the partial derivatives of (12) with respect to W
.
av !L
aw = an+l + I ‘n+l,jwj”
n+ 1 j=l
(13)-12-
By condition (7) equation (13) can be expressed as
where R is a residual due to the truncation of the Taylor series at the
second order.
A final difficulty remains before (14) can be fit to data. The sub-
jective variables~ and u are not observable. Hence, an auxiliary model
must be formulated
ments for p and a.
section, is to use
(14)
as an analogue of producers’ forecasts to obtain instru-
Our procedure,which is briefly discussed in the next
the ~ and u forecasts given by
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Aggregate bimonthly data on cattle slaughter
an ARMA (2, 1, O) model.
for the period from the
second bimonth of 1970 to the fifth bimonth of 1980 were used to estimate
the supply equation (14). The input prices included feeder cattle, corn
and soybean meal. The mean and variance of bimonthly fed cattle price were
used as the relevant moments of the aggregate subjective distributionof
fed cattle price. Bessler examined the problem of obtaining estimates of
the moments of aggregate subjective distributionsand found that the ARIMA
model gave the best estimates. Hence, estimates of the agentst conditional
forecasts three to four bimonths in the future were obtained by using an
ARIMA model. However, it is recognized that conditional forecasts obtained
by using other models may have provided a better fit of the total supply
equation to the data. Because there was first order autocorrelationin the
disturbance terms, it was necessary to transform the data. A modified
Cochrane-Orcuttprocedure was used to obtain a maximum likelihood estimate of
the autocorrelationcoefficient.-13-
The empirical estimates of the parameters of (14) appear in Table 1.
Overall, the model fits the data remarkablywell. Coefficient estimates
on the price of corn and feeder cattle are significant and of the expected
sign. The soybean meal price coefficient is not significantlydifferent
from zero indicatingperhaps that soybean meal is not an
input for cattle feeding in the United States,
Important for our purposes here is the significance
extensivelyused
and expected signs
of the coefficientson the ARIMA forecast of mean and variance of cattle
price. These results suggest that the supply function is upward sloping and
that fed cattle producers are risk averse.
Using equation (9) along with the parameter estimates reported in Table
1, estimates of the value of informationare obtained from simulationsbased
on two more informed distributionsof fed cattle prices. These distributions
are hypotheticalbecause they are not based on additional analysis or composite
forecasts of the fed cattle price series. They are a more accurate description
of fed”cattleprices in the sense that for each bimonth the mean price and
variance values selected are closer to the realized price than is the ARIMA
forecast. It must also be emphasized that since the demand for fed beef is not
infinitely elastic, the value of informationestimates obtained must be
interpreted as the value to a single or small group of producerswhose output
response to new informationhas a negligible impact on market price.
Bimonthly estimates of the value of information for the two hypothe-




Descriptive statistics of the value of informationestimates
period 1970-1980 are reported at the bottom of the table.
price and the correspondingARIMA forecast and variance-14-
Table 1. Parameter Estimates of the Market Risk Averse Supply Function









Mean Fed Cattle Price 1,095,800.*
Variance of Fed Cattle Price -546,440.*
R2 on TransformedData .57
All input prices were divided by USDA’s index of price paid by farmers.
THe ARIMA forecasts are of the deflated mean fed cattle price received by
farmers for fed cattle in the U.S. The dependent variable is U.S.D.A.
estimates of bimonthly commercial cattle slaughter.
* Indicates significanceof a two-tailed t-test at the .05 percent level.
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are also reported. For 1978 through the fourth bimonth of 1979, the ARIMA
model generally underestimatedprice and for the remainder of the period,
fed cattle price was overestimated. The variance of the forecast increased
over the period.
The results indicate that for a group of producers whose output levels
have no noticeable effect on market price, the value of informationembodied
in distribution (D-I) (with the more informed mean 50 percent closer to the
realized price than the ARIMA mean and with more informed and ARIMA variances
equal) averages about 12 cents per cwt over the entire period and ranges from
a low of nearly zero to a high of 95 cents per cwt. The value of information
embodied in an even more accurate forecast (D-II) (with the more informed mean
equal to the realized price and with more”informedvariance only one half of
‘theARIMA forecast variance) averages about 31 cents per cwt for the entire
period, ranging from approximatelyzero to a high of $2.97 cents. The high
occurred.in the second bimonth of 1979 which serves to point out that the value
of informationis larger the greater the difference between q“ and qm. q“ will
tend to be smaller than qm when ~ is smaller than~ and when # is larger than
c#. q“will tend to be larger than qm when the opposite relationshipsoccur
between the parameters of ehe subjective and more informed distributions.
Based on equation (10), the value of perfect informationappears in last
column of Table 2. The estimated mean value of perfect informationis about
46 cents per cwt although the range in value is from approximatelyone-half
cent per cwt to $4.24 per cwt. Again, the largest value of informationoccurred
in the same year as the previous cases, a year when forecast price was low and
the variance of forecast price was reasonably high.-17-
The demand for beef is surely downward sloping and thus these esti-
mates pertain to an individualproducer or to a small group of producers
whose response to informationhas a negligible effect on output price. Since
the estimates in Table 2 are in terms of dollars per cwt of fed cattle pro-
duced, multiplying by mean bimonthly production provides an upper bound to
the values of informationto the industry. For the industry, these esti-
mates are 74.3, 198.0 and 296.0 million dollars for D-I, D-II, and the
value of perfect information,respectively. The usefulness of these values
depends, of course, on the output response of producers to new information.
In the case of the first hypotheticaldistribution (D-I) average bimonthly
output response estimates over the 1970-1980 period are only 16 percent.
The correspondingvalues for D-II and the value of perfect informationare
3.8 percent and 7.5 percent respectively. Thus, while the 74.3 million
dollar figure may be a close approximation,the other two are almost surely
grossly overestimated;or stated another way, depending on the elasticity
of demand, when additional information is disseminatedto the entire
industry, its value per unit of output produced is likely to be substantially
lower than the mean values reported in Table 2.-18-
V. CONCLUSION
An easily computablemoney metric of a risk averse agent’s willing-
ness to pay for additional informationunder price uncertaintywas
developed in this paper. The procedure was empiricallydemonstrated
for a restricted class of utility functions by fitting a risk averse
supply function to time series data from the U.S. fed cattle industry.
While this paper makes a contributionto methods for estimating the
value of information,numerous hurdles remain. Considerationof both
price and production risk can complicate the empirical analysis, depending
on the specificationof the random variables, because condition (7)
may not hold. Another problem is the empirical derivation of market
welfare measures when demand is downward sloping. It is easily shown
that the forecast is invalidatedin this case if account is not taken
of the proportion of the agents in the industry who choose to adopt or
modify the forecast. This issue is addressed in a forthcomingpaper,by
the authors.FOOTNOTES
&/ Lindley (1971) describes a similar measure for the value of infor-
mation, Z, given by EBU(W6 - Z) = E6U(m0), where expectationsare taken with
respect to the Bayesian posterior distributionf~(p). Although both Lindley’s
Z and our V12 are measures of the amount the agent is willing to pay to obtain
more information,in general they may not be equal. There is also a subtle
difference in interpretation. In the Bayesian approach Z is the amount of
money which must be given up by the agent when he produces q~ so that he has
the same amount of utility in the more informed state as producing q“. In
our case, V12 is the amount of money that must be given to the agent when he





if he had produced qm.
F-G in figure 2 provide
E%(T ‘).
The value VIP can also
Whether other measures, such as the distance
equivalent measures to V12 depends on the
be obtained from the risk averse factor demand
function, -aEu(~*)/ac = X*, where C is the price of input X, in a manner
analogous to (9).REFERENCES
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